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The accumulated experience of emerging markets over 
the past two decades has laid bare the tenuous links 
between external financial integration and faster growth, 
on the one hand, and the proclivity of such integration 
to fuel costly crises on the other. These crises have not 
gone without learning. During the 1990s and 2000s, 
emerging markets converged to the middle ground of the 
policy space defined by the macroeconomic trilemma, 
with growing financial integration, controlled exchange 
rate flexibility, and proactive monetary policy. The 
OECD countries moved much faster toward financial 
integration, embracing financial liberalization, opting for 
a common currency in Europe, and for flexible exchange 
rates in other OECD countries. Following their crises of 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. It is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the 
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contacted at josh.aizenman@gmail.com or bpinto2@worldbank.org. 
1997–2001, emerging markets added financial stability 
as a goal, self-insured by building up international 
reserves, and adopted a public finance approach to 
financial integration. The global crisis of 2008–2009, 
which originated in the financial sector of advanced 
economies, meant that the OECD “overshot” the optimal 
degree of financial deregulation while the remarkable 
resilience of the emerging markets validated their public 
finance approach to financial integration. The story is 
not over: with capital flowing in droves to emerging 
markets once again, history could repeat itself without 
dynamic measures to manage capital mobility as part of a 
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1 University of California and NBER; and the World Bank, respectively.  This paper is part of a broader 
investigation at the PREM Anchor of the World Bank on financial integration and economic growth in 
developing countries.  The views herein are entirely those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent 
the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated 
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent, or 
the NBER.   2 
INTRODUCTION 
Emerging market countries suffered a string of severe macroeconomic crises between 
1997 and 2001, starting with East Asia and then continuing with Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-99), 
and Argentina and Turkey (2000-01). These crises coincided with a period of growing external 
financial integration. In spite of the reforms subsequently undertaken, few economists would have 
predicted that developing countries, emerging market and non-emerging market alike, would 
perform as well as they did during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the accompanying global 
financial crisis.
2 Not only did developing countries display considerable resilience during the 
crisis of 2008-09, their economic take-off, including the most populous countries China and 
India, has gradually led to more than half of PPP-adjusted global GDP being produced by these 
countries by 2010. In this sense, the crisis of 2008-09 is a tectonic shift that could unravel Bretton 
Woods II (BW II) and herald a move from a US-centric towards a multi-polar world.
 3  
A widely prevalent view before the Great Recession was that global imbalances, 
epitomized by the current account deficits of the US funded by the surpluses of China and other 
emerging market economies, supported the growth of emerging markets in a sustainable way. 
BW II viewed global imbalances as a win-win configuration -- the allegedly superior financial 
intermediation of the US absorbed the excess savings of the rapidly growing countries, 
facilitating their growth as the US became the demander of last resort. Accordingly, the dollar 
standard of BW I continued its operation in a modified world of growing financial and trade 
integration, with the US the provider of global liquidity and global insurance services to emerging 
markets. The massive accumulation of international reserves (IR) was seen as the counterpart of 
the BW II system, whereby the US benefited from the ―exorbitant privilege‖ of funding its fiscal 
and current account deficits at a lower cost, while China enjoyed export led growth. Financial 
liberalization and integration were viewed as a win-win process, consistent with the operations of 
the above regime. 
With the Great Recession and global financial crisis of 2008-09 raising profound 
questions about the efficacy of international capital markets and the inadequate regulation even of 
sophisticated financial systems like that of the US, this paper provides an overview of the policy 
lessons from the crisis, and the impact of financial policies and capital mobility on the growth and 
                                                 
2 See for example, Development Committee (2010). 
3 The Bretton Woods System or BW I was set up 1944 to deal with post World War II challenges.  This 
was a period when Western Europe and the US engaged in growing trade integration while maintaining 
capital controls.  The collapse of BW I in the early 1970s coincided with a rapid financial integration of the 
OECD countries.  This was followed by the financial opening of emerging markets in the 1990s, leading to 
a rapid increase in their demand for international reserves and, according to Dooley et al. (2003), to the 
emergence of BW II.     3 
stability of emerging markets and the global economy. The paper starts with a selective review of 
the literature on financial globalization and growth. It then continues with the response of both 
the industrialized and developed countries to financial globalization, pointing out the stark 
differences. This discussion is organized around the macroeconomic trilemma, or the idea that 
countries can choose at most two out of the following three: an open capital account (financial 
integration); independent monetary policy; and a fixed exchange rate.  
Next comes a review of the large accumulation of international reserves (IR) by emerging 
market countries. BW II is only one explanation. Arguably, the global crisis has chipped away at 
the credibility of the BW II, US-centric interpretation of global financial intermediation. We also 
discuss other explanations for IR accumulation like the buffer stock argument, mitigation of real 
exchange rate volatility, mercantilism reflecting concerns about relative competitiveness, and 
self-insurance against foreign and domestic shocks. Self-insurance with an added emphasis on 
financial stability and putting the fiscal house in order emerges as the most convincing 
explanation in a second-best world.  
The discussion on IR accumulation is followed by outlining a public finance approach to 
financial integration based in large part on the actual response of emerging markets to their crises 
of 1997-2001. A provocative hypothesis is that the global crisis of 2008-09 means that the 
financial sector in OECD countries may have grown beyond socially desirable levels, pitting 
those who would reform it with a view to restricting its untrammeled growth against those with 
vested interests in a minimum of regulation and publicly funded bailouts; while the comparative 
resilience of developing countries is a tribute to the corrective measures they took after their own 
crises of 1997-2001. The paper ends with a summary of policy conclusions. 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
  This selective survey is divided into two parts: the links between financial globalization 
and growth on the one hand and macroeconomic crises on the other. 
 
Financial Globalization and Growth
4  
Expectations and optimism were rife at the beginning of the 1990s that growing financial 
integration would speed up growth in developing countries and help with income convergence. 
The channel through which this would happen would involve global savings being channeled into 
investment in capital-scarce developing countries. Aizenman, Radziwill and Pinto (2004, 2007)—
APR—examined whether there was any increase in the extent to which the domestic physical 
                                                 
4 This section draws on chapter 7 in Pinto (Forthcoming).   4 
stock of capital in developing countries was financed by foreign savings consequent upon 
growing financial integration. They constructed a ―self-financing ratio‖ for the period 1991 to 
2001 using a 10-year horizon for 47 developing countries and 22 OECD countries using data for 
the period 1981-2001. The first step was to derive an estimate of the capital stock in year t minus 
10 using the national income accounts. The next step was to add the cumulative national 
investment over the 10-year period to this initial capital stock, and then divide this by the initial 
capital stock plus the cumulative national savings over the same period to obtain the self-
financing ratio, with suitable adjustments made for depreciation.
5 The purpose was to see how the 
self-financing ratio varied over the 1990s in response to growing financial integration and to 
compare the 2001 ratio with that in 1991. 
  APR‘s main findings were first, that the average self-financing ratio for developing 
countries did not change much over the 1990s, global financial liberalization notwithstanding. 
Second, there did not seem to be a growth bonus associated with greater external financing of the 
domestic capital stock. To the contrary, countries with higher self-financing ratios grew 
significantly faster. Third, more volatile self-financing ratios were associated with lower growth; 
but this result disappears when a proxy for the quality of institutions was included in the cross-
country regressions. But the strong, asymmetric effect of self-financing on growth remained: a 
rise in the self-financing ratio from 1.0 to 1.1 was associated with increasing the average per 
capita growth, from 2.8 percent to 4.4 percent, while a drop from 1.0 to 0.9 lowered per capita 
growth from 2.8 percent to 2.2 percent.
6 
Self-financed growth is not a new idea. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) wrote a seminal 
paper asking how internationally mobile capital really was. In regressing national investment 
rates on national savings rates for 21 OECD countries using data from 1960 to 1974, they 
consistently found coefficients close to 1.0 and stable over time. These results were evocative of a 
closed economy, suggesting capital was not as mobile across borders as might have been 
assumed; if it were, one would expect a close to zero correlation between national saving and 
national investment. This finding became enshrined as the ―Feldstein-Horioka puzzle‖ and is 
evocative of home biases and self-financed growth.
7 
In a paper related to APR, Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007)—PRS—examined the 
links between capital flows and growth in the financially globalized 1990s. The starting point of 
                                                 
5 For details and caveats, see Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004, 2007).  
6 If the country is on average running current account surpluses, the self-financing ratio would exceed 1. 
7 It would of course be a genuine puzzle only if there were no legal restrictions on capital flows across 
countries.  In other words, F-H were testing de facto capital mobility.  See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for 
further discussion of the various F-H interpretations.     5 
their enquiry was twofold: the perverse flow of capital from poor to rich countries; and the 
allocation puzzle of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), namely, that within the group of developing 
countries, net capital inflows tend to find their way to the slower-growing countries. Against this 
background, PRS found a positive correlation between average current account balances and 
average growth rates for developing countries after controlling for the standard growth 
determinants during 1970-2000. Moreover, they find that this correlation was driven more by 
savings than investment: when savings-to-GDP is included in the growth regression, the 
coefficient on the current account balance dropped to zero but remained virtually unchanged 
when the investment rate was included (recall the accounting identity national savings =current 
account surplus plus investment), suggesting the dominant role of savings.  
  The explanation PRS favor about why savings are positively correlated with growth is 
that financial systems tend to be under-developed in developing countries. So not all the savings 
are intermediated into investment and part of it gets parked abroad via current account surpluses, 
leading to an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Alternatively, foreign exchange 
reserves get built up either because countries want to avoid overvaluation or because they want a 
cushion against the volatility of capital flows.  
  The preceding results fly in the face of neoclassical economics, according to which 
capital should flow from rich to poor countries in order to equalize per capita incomes. One 
reason this may not happen is that expected marginal returns may not be higher in poorer 
countries even though they have lower capital-to-labor ratios either because of low total factor 
productivity or high risk or both. But even in a situation where marginal returns are higher in 
poorer countries, the welfare benefits of financial integration may be limited. Gourinchas and 
Jeanne (2006) examined financial integration in a calibrated neoclassical model and found that 
the welfare gains in switching from financial autarky to full capital mobility equal a paltry 1 
percent increase in domestic consumption for the typical non-OECD country. This should come 
as a dampener to economists who may have advocated capital account openness as a way of 
speeding up income convergence.  
The truly compelling point in Gourinchas-Jeanne is that financial integration will have a 
significant impact on welfare only if it contrives to substantially bridge the gap between the levels 
of total factor productivity in poor and rich countries—which goes substantially beyond simply 
equalizing growth rates or even the marginal returns to capital. For example, Gourinchas-Jeanne 
find that if financial integration eliminated 25 percent of the productivity gap with the US, the 
welfare gains for the prototypical developing country would be 50 times larger than that in the 
standard neoclassical model.    6 
The big question therefore is whether financial integration can help bridge this gap and if 
so, what the channels would be. For example, foreign direct investment could help narrow 
productivity gaps through technological spillovers; but it is far from obvious that letting foreign 
portfolio investors into the stock market or government treasury bill market in developing 
countries can do this. In other words, the type of financial inflow matters, a point looked at in a 
detailed, disaggregated fashion by Aizenman and Sushko (2011a). They examined the differential 
impact of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI inflows on 37 manufacturing industries, 99 
countries over 1991-2007, extending the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology. Net portfolio debt 
inflows were found to be negatively associated with growth during the mid 1990s. The 
magnitudes of the negative effect of surges in portfolio debt inflows on growth were substantial 
in the late 1990s for a number of countries. The effect of debt inflows on growth in the 2000s was 
rather muted. Surges in portfolio equity inflows also exhibit a negative association with aggregate 
growth in the manufacturing sector.
8 Equity inflows exhibited economically significant positive 
impact on the growth of financially constrained industries, unlike their negative impact on the 
average manufacturing growth rate. FDI inflows exhibited a positive association with aggregate 
manufacturing growth during most of the sample period, both at the aggregate level and 
specifically for the industries in need of external financing.  
 
Financial Globalization and Crises 
As a point of transition between financial integration and its links with growth versus 
crisis, we start with the main findings in the burgeoning literature on conditions conducive to 
growth acceleration and economic takeoffs [see Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) and 
Aizenman and Spiegel (2010), and the references therein]. This literature has been motivated in 
part by the growing global weight of emerging-market economics and the growing gap between 
nonemerging developing and the emerging market countries. Is financial integration conducive to 
sustainable takeoffs and economic growth? Aizenman and Sushko (2011b) suggest a rich and 
complex marginal association between various capital flows and economic takeoffs. Higher FDI 
inflows are associated with a higher takeoff probability relative to zero FDI inflows, and this 
effect is highest for the Latin America subsample. In contrast, a higher stock of short-term 
external debt has been associated with a substantial negative effect on the probability of a takeoff, 
and the cumulative effect of the short-terms debt overhang is largest for Latin American 
                                                 
8 For instance, the inflow surge during the financial liberalization period, 1993-1994, was associated with a 
sharp decline in aggregate manufacturing sector growth, but a rise in the growth of relatively more 
financially constrained industries.   7 
countries. Yet, virtually all the takeoffs were associated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. This 
effect is substantial for Latin America, while it is virtually absent in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
association between financial links through portfolio equity flows and takeoffs is negative.  
The analysis of the duration of takeoffs shows that higher net portfolio debt inflows 
increase it while the opposite is true of equity inflows. In contrast, higher net FDI inflows at the 
time of the takeoff are associated with a lower probability that the takeoff will be sustained. This 
finding parallels that of Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), who find that the positive 
association between FDI and economic growth observed between 1970 and 2000 no longer held 
between 2000 and 2004, and of Aizenman and Sushko (2011a), who find that the relationship 
between FDI inflows and real sector growth turns from positive to negative following prolonged 
periods of steady FDI inflows into a country.
9  
In sum, it is not just the degree of financial openness, but the nature of financial 
integration that matters for a country‘s prospects of embarking on and sustaining economic 
takeoffs. Furthermore, the complex association between FDI and economic takeoffs – direct 
financing is associated with greater number of takeoffs, but not with the most sustained ones – is 
in line with several recent studies that detect a non-linear association between the accumulation of 
FDI and growth.  
  Turning now to the financial integration-crisis link, more than any literature survey, the 
spate of emerging market crises after 1997 is eloquent testimony to the difficulty of avoiding 
macroeconomic and financial crises with an open capital account and a high degree of financial 
integration. In addition to these two features, countries which suffered a serious macroeconomic 
crisis between 1997 and 2001 were apt to exhibit a fixed exchange rate (all; explicit in some cases 
as part of disinflation programs, e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Turkey and implicit in the case of 
Thailand and other East Asian countries); unsustainable government debt dynamics (Argentina, 
Russia) or big jumps in government debt as a result of private sector bailouts (East Asia, Turkey); 
and balance sheet problems (East Asia in particular, also Argentina and Turkey, with liabilities, 
often short-term, denominated in US dollars and assets in local currency).
10  
                                                 
9 One interpretation of this result is that countries in which the economic takeoff is driven by FDI inflows 
converge to a new steady state faster, resulting in a shorter duration of high growth rates. Alternatively, 
―green‖ FDI may compete for financing with domestic firms, crowding incumbent firms out of local bank 
lending, especially if the domestic financial industry is not sufficiently developed. 
10 For case studies, see Serven and Perry (2005) on Argentina, Pinto and Ulatov (2011) on Russia.  An 
overview is contained in Gill and Pinto (2005).  Aizenman and Sun (2009) document the key role of 
balance sheet exposure in explaining the use of international reserves by half of the emerging markets 
during the crisis.  See also Eichengreen Hausmann and Panizza (2003) for a discussion of the implications 
of balance sheet exposures on the vulnerability of developing countries.    8 
If any set of countries stood a chance of benefiting from financial integration, surely the 
European Union accession countries would qualify because of the financial, product and factor 
market integration bolstered by the superior institutional pull of the EU. But even here hangs a 
cautionary tale, compellingly illustrated by the experience of the Euro periphery countries, 
Greece and Portugal. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argued that the large current account deficits 
they were running at the turn of the millennium were consistent with neoclassical income 
convergence. These deficits could be explained by higher returns to capital in these capital-
scarce, poor countries relative to the Euro Area average, which would propel investment. In 
addition, higher expected growth would tend to increase consumption in line with the permanent 
income hypothesis and lower savings. Both factors would lead to larger current account deficits. 
Empirically, the authors found a growing positive link over time between income and current 
account balances in the euro area, with the rise in the current account deficits of the poorer 
countries driven more by a decline in private savings than an increase in investment—a pattern 
replicated in Greece and Portugal. They also found a decline in the cross-country correlation 
between savings and investment in the euro area, concluding that ―At least for this last group, the 
Feldstein-Horioka phenomenon appears to have largely disappeared.‖ (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
B-G 2002 p. 149). Since the large current account deficits of Greece and Portugal were driven by 
convergence and integration, B-G argued that there was no immediate cause for worry.  
In contrast to Greece and Portugal (but in keeping with self-financed growth) B-G noted 
that Ireland grew much faster by raising public and hence national savings dramatically. This 
enabled current account surpluses as well as higher investment rates. The eventual outcome was 
that Ireland‘s PPP GDP per capita raced from 70 percent of the EU average in 1987 to 120 
percent by 2002. Post Great Recession and as of writing this paper, all three countries are mired 
in a serious sovereign debt crisis—Ireland‘s driven by the bailout of its private banks and 
Greece‘s and Portugal‘s by unsustainable public debt dynamics.
 11 
  The idea that financial liberalization could stoke vulnerability and eventually publicly 
financed bailouts of the private sector was not new: the Irish crisis of 2011 is similar to East 
Asia‘s over 1997-98, where the public finances were sustainable but contingent liabilities built up 
on the balance sheets of the private sector. And East Asia‘s crisis in turn was eerily similar to 
Diaz-Alejandro‘s (1985) classic description of the crises in the Southern Cone and Chile in 
particular over 1979-82 replete with a fixed exchange rate and costly bailouts of the private 
                                                 
11 IMF (2008) chapter 6 discusses the sharp contrast between the persistent current account surpluses in 
emerging Asia and the current account deficits in emerging Europe, and the sustainability of both.  The 
experience of Greece and Portugal indicates that even seemingly benign current account deficits pose the 
risk of a build up of serious vulnerability over time.    9 
sector. From the perspective of our paper, what made a vital difference to emerging market 
countries were the steps they took after 2001 to self-insure, of which the most visible 
manifestation was the building up of IR—although, as we shall see, other equally important 
measures were taken. 
 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY RESPONSE TO MACROECONOMIC VULNERABILITY 
Putting the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s together, emerging markets have been on a 
steep learning curve. In this section we link financial stability to the broader context of the macro 
tradeoffs facing emerging markets and developing countries. In the 1980s, most emerging 
markets operated with low financial integration and rampant capital controls, strong preferences 
for exchange rate stability, relatively low levels of international reserves-to-GDP ratios, and 
active monetary policy. These patterns were modified substantially during the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Navigating the Trilemma  
A compact way of capturing the response of developing countries is to base it on the 
macroeconomic policy trilemma. This trilemma, or the ability to accomplish at most two out of 
following three policy objectives – financial integration, exchange rate stability and monetary 
autonomy- is a key implication of the Mundell-Fleming macroeconomic framework. A lingering 
challenge in applying it is that, in practice, most countries rarely face the binary choices 
articulated by the trilemma. Instead, countries choose the degree of financial integration and 
exchange rate flexibility. Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2010) allow for this by constructing three 
indexes measuring the trilemma dimensions of each country. Applying these indexes, Aizenman 
et al. (2011) validated that the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a 
constant, where all the weights are positive.
12 This result confirms the notion that a rise in one 
trilemma variable is traded off against a linear weighted drop in the sum of the other two.  
                                                 
12 The analysis was applied to a panel of the trilemma indices of 50 countries (32 of which are developing 
countries) during 1970-2006 period for which there is a balanced data set (the requirement of a balanced 
panel reduced the number of countries in the sample substantially).  The study applies a linear regression, 
testing the hypothesis that the linear sum of the three indices (without a constant term) adds up to a positive 
constant, where all the regression coefficients are positive.  The regression analysis confirms this 
hypothesis, with R
2 well above 0.9, for three sub-groups: Industrial Countries, Non-Emerging Developing 
Countries, and Emerging Market Countries. The overall results are robust to the possibility of allowing 
structural, endogenously determined breaks in the data (the years of 1973, 1982, 1997-98, and 2001 were 
identified as candidates for structural breaks, and tested for the equality of the group mean of the indexes 
over the candidate break points for each of the subsample groups). 
  
.   10 
Figure 1 plots the average patterns of the trilemma indexes for emerging markets, 
developing non-emerging market countries, and the industrialized countries, where each index is 
normalized to between 0 and 1 (the definitions are contained in the notes to Figure 1). The figure 
indicates that emerging markets have converged to the middle ground of the economic trilemma: 
controlled financial openness, managed exchange rate flexibility, and active monetary policy. In 
contrast, the OECD countries have opted for more polarized choices in the trilemma 
configuration: rapidly approaching full financial integration, and either flexible exchange rates 
(and active monetary policy) or a currency area in Europe (where each country gives up its 
monetary independence).  
Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the level of monetary independence in 
industrialized and developing countries was similar. However, a divergence began in the early 
1990s. While developing countries have been hovering around intermediate levels of monetary 
independence and slightly deviating from the cross-country average, industrialized countries have 
steadily become much less independent in terms of monetary policy, reflecting the decisions 
made by the euro member countries.
13  
Regarding the exchange rate, industrialized countries experienced a constant level of 
exchange rate stability until the end of the 1990s, while developing countries have been on a clear 
trend toward more exchange rate flexibility since the mid-1970s. After the introduction of the 
euro in 1999, industrialized countries drastically increased the level of exchange rate stability 
while developing countries continued to remain around the mid-level of exchange rate 
flexibility.
14  
Not surprisingly, industrialized countries have achieved higher levels of financial 
openness throughout the period. The acceleration of financial openness in the mid-1990s 
remained significantly higher than the cross-country average of both the full sample and 
developing non-emerging markets subsample. For emerging markets, there has been a marked 
trend towards financial openness after 1990, but only after some retrenchment during the 1980s. 
This would appear to be the big difference between emerging markets and developing, non-
emerging markets. Indeed, the main take away from the perspective of the discussion which 
follows is that emerging market countries sharply increased their financial openness after 1990 
while settling for moderate levels of exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy independence.  
                                                 
13 When the euro countries are removed from the industrialized countries sample, the extent of the 
divergence from the average becomes less marked although there is still a tendency among the non-euro 
countries to move toward lower levels of monetary independence. 
14 The trend of the non-euro industrialized countries after the late 1990s more or less traces that of 
developing countries though it is a little more volatile.   11 
 
Building up International Reserves
15  
Despite the proliferation of greater exchange rate flexibility for developing countries 
noted above, the ratio of international reserves to GDP has increased substantially, as shown in 
Figure 2. At the end of 1999, reserves were about 6 percent of global GDP, 3.5 times what they 
were at the end of 1960, and 50 percent higher than in 1990. Practically all the increase in reserve 
holdings has been in developing countries, mostly in East Asia (Flood and Marion 2002), with the 
question of whether reserve holdings were excessive being raised (Edison (2003)). Reserve 
accumulation continued in the 2000s, with emerging markets increasing the ratio of international 
reserves to GDP from single-digit percentage levels in the 1980s to 15 to 30 percent of GDP for 
most, with some countries exceeding 50 percent (China; Hong Kong SAR, China; and Singapore 
in 2007)—something unprecedented.  
Table 1: Evolution of reserve adequacy measures 
Period  Evolving adequacy measure  Influential contributors 
1950s-1980  Months of imports; dealing with trade volatility  Triffin, Heller 
Late 1990s-
early 2000s 
Short term external debt/IR, dealing with sudden 
stop of capital flows  
Guidotti-Greenspan 
2000s  M2/IR, dealing with sudden capital flight from 
domestic assets  
Calvo  
Obstfeld, Shambaugh & 
Taylor 
2000s  Hybrid; increasing with external debt/GDP, 
M2/GDP, country risk, and foreigners‘ 
shareholdings.  
Wijnholds and Kapteyn 
Aizenman, Lee and Rhee 
 2000s  Provided a calibration cum estimation that allows 
estimating ―optimal IR‖ as a function of the costs 
and probability of sudden stops  
 Garcia and Soto 
 Jeanne & Ranciere 
 Jeanne 
 
This section focuses on the evolution of the underlying motives for IR accumulation by 
developing countries. Table 1shows the evolution of ‗reserve adequacy ratios‘ overtime. Under 
BW I, IR served mostly as a buffer to deal with trade uncertainty. Reserve adequacy was 
measured by months of imports with a rule of thumb considering four months of imports 
reasonable. This approach was suitable in a world with limited financial integration, with trade 
openness being the main channel for external shocks (Fischer 2001). Absent sufficient reserves, 
                                                 
15 This section draws on Aizenman (2011).   12 
balance of payments deficits would have to be corrected through sharp contractions in investment 
and consumption, thereby inducing recessionary pressures. This rule of thumb gave way to the 
cost-benefit calculus of the buffer stock approach, which in turn was replaced by the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule. Guidotti-Greenspan culminated in self-insurance as financial considerations 
became dominant and the growing exposure of emerging markets to sudden stops and capital 
flight crises increased the demand for IR as a cushion against financial instability. We review this 
evolution.  
 
Buffer Stock Approach 
The early literature focused on IR as a buffer stock in supporting an adjustable-peg or 
managed-floating exchange-rate regime. Heller (1966) was the first to derive the optimal level of 
reserves using a cost-benefit approach.
16 Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) reformulated Heller‘s 
approach in an optimal inventory management framework balancing the macroeconomic 
adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves, or when reserves get exhausted, with the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves. Extensions of the buffer stock model predict that average 
optimal reserves depend negatively on the opportunity cost of reserves, and exchange rate 
flexibility; and positively on GDP, adjustment costs, and reserve volatility, driven frequently by 
the underlying volatility of international trade. Overall, the literature of the 1980s supported these 
predictions (Flood and Marion 2002). 
 
  Guidotti-Greenspan Rule 
The financial integration of the 1990s made the reigning measures of reserves adequacy 
based on trade flows obsolete as more volatile financial flows became dominant. The presumptive 
candidate advanced as the new measure of adequate reserves was the Guidotti-Greenspan rule 
advanced in 1999: reserves needed to match short-term external debt (defined as total external 
debt with an original or remaining maturity less than a year plus interest due).  Such a level would 
provide the central bank with the needed liquidity to meet the demand for foreign currency if a 
sudden stop prevented external refinancing of the short-term debt. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that the expected benefit of following the Guidotti-Greenspan rule is about 1 
percent of GDP if holding reserves equal to short-term external debt reduced the annual 
probability of a sharp reversal in capital flows by 10 percent (in line with Rodrik and Velasco 
                                                 
16 The  benefit  from  holding  reserves in Heller‘s model stems from  the  ability  to  avoid  a  reduction  in  
output  in  case  of  a  deficit  in  the balance  of  payments.  The opportunity  cost  of  holding  reserves  is  
the gap  between  the  return  on  capital  and  on  reserves.     13 
(1999), Rodrik (2006)), and if the output cost of a financial crisis is about 10 percent of GDP, as 
found by Hutchison and Noy (2006). Similar results have been obtained using more elaborate 
models (Garcia and Soto (2004); Jeanne and Ranciere (2006)).  
One challenge to the Guidotti-Greenspan rule came from the concern that it focused on 
exposure to external volatility in the form of a sudden stop in capital inflows. Yet, policy makers 
may also accumulate reserves as a buffer against internal volatility. Domestic instability may 
trigger  internal conflicts, leading to ―sudden capital flight.‖ In these circumstances, the private 
sector would opt to swap domestic currency assets with assets denominated in foreign currency 
(Calvo (2006)). Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) found that the liquid liabilities of the 
banking system as measured by M2 provide a good proxy for the domestic exposure to such 
liquidation shocks. A higher ratio of international reserves to M2 would provide a thicker 
cushion, thereby reducing the adverse effects of sudden capital flight on the real exchange, and 
possibly even reducing the probability of a sudden capital flight crisis in the first place (to the 
extent that such a crisis has a self-fulfilling element). 
Calvo‘s ―sudden capital flight‖ concerns were vividly illustrated by the Argentine 
financial meltdown of the early 2000s. The hope that backing the monetary base by international 
reserves would prevent exchange rate instability was dashed. A lesson of the Argentine crisis is 
that currency boards and fixed exchange rate arrangements should be supported with stringent 
prudential supervision, and the dynamic management of reserves. Reserves should be well above 
the monetary base, reflecting the entire balance sheet of the economy. The experience of Hong 
Kong SAR, China, supports this logic, suggesting that enduring fixed exchange rate regimes are 
feasible provided there is constant investment in credibility, including possibly by a decrease in 
the discretionary element of policies (see Genberg and Hui (2011)). A hefty international reserve 
position, well above the monetary base, and a large sovereign wealth fund, would help.  
The second challenge came from an analysis of post-1998 trends in hoarding reserves, 
especially in East Asia. The greater flexibility of the exchange rates should have worked in the 
direction of reducing reserve hoarding, but the opposite was clearly happening. While the 
Guidotti-Greenspan rule focused on the ratio of reserves to short-term debt, Kim et al. (2005) 
looked at a more flexible rule based on the behavior of different types of capital flows. An 
application to selected Asian countries led them to conclude that the countries affected by the 
East Asian crisis held excessive reserves by 2003— the affected countries had already built up 
more than adequate reserve levels to handle a repeat of the actual capital outflows that occurred 
during the 1997–98 crises scaled up to 2003 values.    14 
But a new variable crept into this debate about whether reserve holdings were really 
excessive: the rapidly changing structure of EMs‘ financial integration, which implied that future 
crises would not resemble earlier ones. For example, one of the countries affected by the 1997–98 
crisis, Korea, lifted restrictions on foreign equity ownership in the aftermath of the crisis. In 
response, foreigners‘ shareholding as a percentage of the total market capitalization rose from 12 
percent in 1997 to 40 percent by 2003. Arguably, the sizable accumulation of reserves by Korea 
during that period may have reflected the wish to cover short-term external debt plus some 
portion of the foreigners‘ shareholdings, with the intention of reducing the chances of large real 
exchange rate depreciations associated with capital flow reversals (Aizenman, Lee and Rhee 
(2007)).
 17 This debate led to the notion of self-insurance. But before we go discuss self-insurance 
as a prime motive for reserve accumulation, we present its rival, the mercantilist view. 
 
Mercantilism and Relative Competitiveness  
The views linking the large increase in hoarding reserves to growing exposure to sudden 
stops associated with financial integration face a well-known contender in a modern incarnation 
of mercantilism (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003). According to this interpretation, 
reserve accumulation is a by-product of promoting exports, which is needed to create better jobs, 
thereby absorbing abundant labor in traditional sectors. Though intellectually intriguing, this 
interpretation remains debatable—the history of Japan and Korea suggests the near-absence of 
mercantilist hoarding of international reserves during the phase of fast growth, and the prevalence 
of export promotion by preferential financing in targeted sectors. Floundering economic growth 
led to the onset of large hoarding of reserves in Japan and Korea, probably due to both 
mercantilist motives and self-insurance in order to deal with growing fragility of the banking 
system. These perspectives suggest that the massive hoarding of reserves by China is a hybrid of 
the mercantilist and self-insurance motives. Yet mercantilist hoarding by one country may induce 
competitive hoarding by other countries to preempt any competitive advantage gained by the first 
country, a reaction that would dissipate most competitiveness gains (Aizenman and Lee 2008). 
This view is supported by the interdependence of the demand for international reserves among 
East Asian countries (Cheung and Qian 2009). 
 
 
                                                 
17 This policy stopped around 2005, delinking reserve accumulation from increases in external borrowing 
[see Aizenman, 2010, ―Macro Prudential Supervision in the Open Economy, and the Role of Central Banks 
in Emerging Markets,‖ Open Economies Review].   15 
Self-insurance 
Self-insurance is a natural progression in the debate about whether emerging markets 
hold excessive reserves. Deeper financial integration of developing countries has increased their 
exposure to volatile short-term inflows of capital (or ―hot money‖) subject to frequent sudden 
stops and reversals (see Calvo 1998; Edwards 2004). The magnitude and speed of the reversal of 
capital flows throughout the 1997–98 East Asian financial crisis shocked most observers 
(Aizenman and Marion 2003). East Asian countries had been perceived as less vulnerable to the 
perils associated with hot money than Latin American countries. After all, these countries were 
more open to international trade, had sounder fiscal policies, and much stronger growth 
performance. In retrospect, the 1997–98 crisis exposed the hidden balance sheet vulnerabilities of 
East Asian countries, forcing the market to update the probability of sudden stops affecting all 
countries. 
Against this, hoarding international reserves can be viewed as a precautionary step, a 
form of self-insurance against sudden stops. ―Self-insurance‖ has several interpretations. The first 
focuses on international reserves as output stabilizers (Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb 1992; Aizenman 
and Lee 2007). International reserves can reduce the probability of an output drop induced by a 
sudden stop and/or curtail the depth of the output collapse when the sudden stop materializes, an 
argument that is in line with the Guidotti-Greenspan rule of thumb. Rodrik (2006) sets out the 
logic of the Guidotti-Greenspan rule precisely in terms of avoiding the costs of sudden stops. He 
points out that it remains a puzzle why developing countries have not tried harder to reduce short-
term foreign liabilities.
18 
A related view of self-insurance is that hoarding international reserves is needed to 
stabilize fiscal expenditures in developing countries (Aizenman and Marion 2004).
 Specifically, a 
country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection 
costs, and sovereign risk may want to accumulate both IR and external debt, a combination that 
allows the country to smooth consumption when output is volatile. This framework also suggests 
that greater political instability would reduce reserve accumulation, a result that is supported by 
the data. By implication, higher international reserves, other things being equal, may signal lower 
susceptibility to crisis, thereby reducing sovereign spreads.
19  
                                                 
18 One obvious reason is that this is not a one-sided choice: the maturity and currency composition of 
liabilities is determined by demand and supply. 
19 This may reflect the deterrent effect of higher international reserves, signaling a deeper pocket of 
liquidity of the central bank.  See Central Bank of Chile (2009), box II.2 and De Gregorio (2011) for 
evidence on the positive influence of IR on changes in EMBI spreads during the subprime crisis.      16 
A similar angle is that reserve accumulation may lower real exchange rate volatility, in 
turn permitting a smoother output path and a potentially higher growth rate (Hviding, Nowak and 
Ricci (2004), Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2008)). The growth literature of the 1990s identified 
large adverse effects of exogenous volatility on GDP and on economic growth in developing 
countries. An important channel transmitting or even amplifying the negative effects of such 
volatility would be imperfect capital markets and low levels of financial development in 
developing countries (Aghion et al. 2009). The mitigation of real exchange rate volatility through 
reserve accumulation would then help developing countries, as they are much more dependent on 
commodity trade, in both exports and imports.
20  
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) link reserve hoarding to three factors associated 
with the shift discussed above in the trilemma configuration since 1990. The first factor is the 
―fear of floating,‖ manifested in the desire to tightly manage the exchange rate (or to keep fixing 
it) for a range of reasons--to boost trade, mitigate destabilizing balance sheet shocks in the 
presence of dollarized liabilities, and provide a transparent nominal anchor for inflationary 
expectations (Calvo and Reinhart (2002)).  The second factor is the adoption of active policies to 
develop and increase the depth of domestic financial intermediation through a larger domestic 
banking and financial system relative to GDP. The third factor is complementing the deepening 
of domestic financial intermediation with an increase in external financial integration. The 
combination of these three elements increases the exposure of the economy to financial storms, in 
the worst case leading to financial meltdowns, as was vividly illustrated by the Mexican 1994-95 
crisis, the 1997-98 East Asian crisis, and the Argentine 2001-2 financial collapse. 
Notwithstanding the rising prominence of financial considerations, the debate over 
whether emerging markets continue to hold excessive reserves remains alive. Jeanne and 
Ranciere (2006) and Jeanne (2007) develop a utility-based welfare analysis of the optimal 
hoarding of international reserves and a calibration-cum-regression analysis that tests whether 
recent trends are consistent with the model‘s predictions. For the typical emerging market 
country, the model can plausibly explain a reserves-to-GDP ratio on the order of 10 percent, close 
to the long-run historical average. It can justify even higher levels assuming reserves can prevent 
crises. The levels of reserves recently observed in the mid 2000s in many countries, particularly 
in Latin America, are within the range of the model‘s predictions. For emerging market countries 
in the aggregate, however, the insurance model fails to account for the recent reserves buildup 
because the risk of a capital account crisis in the Asian countries, where most of the buildup has 
                                                 
20 The exposure to the income effects triggered by commodity terms of trade shocks of developing 
countries exceeds that of the OECD countries by a factor of 3.   17 
taken place, seems much too small to justify such levels of self-insurance. These results are in 
line with the analysis in Garcia and Soto (2004). 
Notice that the results above were obtained before the global financial crisis of 2008-09, 
during which emerging markets acquitted themselves remarkably well. This raises the question 
anew of whether reserve holdings were excessive and eventually worth it, since they helped 
underpin resilience during the worst global crisis since World War II. We turn to this question 
next, starting with a public finance perspective to crisis prevention. 
 
A PUBLIC FINANCE APPROACH TO FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  
With financial factors becoming dominant during the 1990s, the macro challenges facing 
developing countries went beyond navigating the trilemma triangle. More financially open, 
financially deeper countries, with greater exchange rate stability tended to hold more reserves. 
Within the emerging market sample, the fixed exchange rate effect weakened in explaining 
reserve accumulation, but financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) grew in importance (Cheung 
and Ito (2009), Obstfeld et al. (2010)). Trade openness remained a robust determinant of reserve 
demand, though its importance diminished. The growing importance of financial factors in 
explaining rising international reserve-to-GDP ratios (Aizenman and Lee (2007)) is in line with a 
broader self-insurance view against both external and domestic shocks. Nevertheless, as noted 
above, the idea that emerging markets held excessive reserves persisted.  
In parallel, and somewhat schizophrenically, the feasibility of EMs being able to self-
insure against sudden stops was raised. Following the 1997-2001 crises, Caballero (2003) 
summarized the state-of-the-art on insuring EMs. His starting point was that countries can self-
insure against fluctuations over the business cycle; but doing so against the ruinous effects of 
sudden stops was not feasible because of the extreme volatility and large size of capital flows. 
The necessary insurance markets and instruments did not exist: available instruments might hedge 
the annual fiscal revenues of a commodity-exporting country against oil or copper price risk, but 
not against a sudden stop. Caballero therefore proposed new instruments centered on contingent 
bonds targeted explicitly at exogenous shocks not under the control of emerging markets. On the 
reserve build up, he noted: ―…these economies are self-insuring through costly accumulation of 
large international reserves and stabilization funds. Most individuals would be ‗underinsured‘ if 
they had to leave a million dollars aside for a potential automobile collision and the liabilities that 
would follow, rather than buying insurance against such event; countries are no different. 
Underinsurance is what greatly amplifies these countries‘ recessions.‖    18 
 Without taking a position on whether the reserve accumulation by emerging markets was 
excessive or not, it is important to point out that emerging markets did much more than simply 
build up reserves after the 1997-2001 crises. These crises did not simply change the West‘s 
perception of emerging markets (of East Asia in particular, where fiscal probity and the 
dominance of the private sector might have fueled complacency) but more importantly changed 
the perceptions of emerging markets about themselves. Table 2 provides more detail regarding 
the response of emerging markets to the crises of the 1980s and 1997-2001 by linking specific 
policy measures to the three generations of crisis models that were developed to capture the 
growing coverage and sophistication of the underlying crisis elements.
21 
Table 2: Evolving Crisis Response of Emerging Markets  
 
Goal  Policies   Comments 
 
1. Restore sustainable debt 
dynamics  
(First generation) 
  Raise primary fiscal 
surpluses for prolonged 
period 
  Improve expenditure 
composition and tax 
regime 
  Strengthen fiscal 
institutions. 
Might have to cut even good 
public investments in order to 
raise primary surpluses 
(similar to external debt 
overhang of 1980s) 
2. Lower contingent liabilities 
associated with private sector  
(Third generation) 
  Shift to flexible exchange 
rates 
  Monitor private external 
borrowing and currency 
mismatches 
  Strengthen financial 
institutions.  
Flexible exchange rates will 
reduce incentive for currency 
mismatches but direct controls 
may also be needed by central 
bank on volume of private 
external debt and loan-to-
deposit ratios of commercial 
banks 
3. Insure against shifting 
market sentiment and possible 
sudden stops 
(Second generation) 
  Build up foreign exchange 
reserves 
  Restrict currency 
mismatches on 
government and private 
balance sheets. 
―Ideal‖ level of reserves will 
depend upon short-term 
external debt, flexibility of 
exchange rates and extent of 
currency mismatches 
Source: Chapter 7, Pinto (forthcoming). 
  
                                                 
21 The first generation crisis model honed in on the inconsistency of fiscal deficits financed by credit 
creation and a fixed exchange rate; the second generation on confidence crises, international liquidity and 
multiple equilibria; while the third brought in balance sheet exposures.  Key contributions were made by 
Krugman (1979, 1999), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1994), Chang and Velasco (2000) and 
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001).  For summaries, see Frankel and Wei (2005) and Pinto 
(forthcoming).   19 
The table adds two elements to the policy trilemma: the accumulation of IR, which has 
been discussed above; and government‘s intertemporal budget constraint. IR accumulation has 
proceeded in tandem with measures to bolster the public finances: according to the arguments laid 
out in Pinto (forthcoming) reforms which lowered public indebtedness while curbing contingent 
liabilities from private sector balance sheets have been pivotal in establishing credibility and 
lowering vulnerability. The two together have buffered the move to the trilemma middle ground 
and facilitated financial stability. 
In other words, the response of emerging markets evolved into a ―public finance 
approach‖ to financial integration and managing macroeconomic risk. The public finance 
approach has three elements: first, putting the fiscal house in order so as to create space for 
addressing tail risks;
22 second, recognizing from experience that good management of the public 
finances is not enough—costly externalities and bailout costs associated with the private 
(especially, financial) sector need to be factored in; and third, strengthening financial sector 
regulation and supervision are essential.  
The efficacy of self-insurance underpinned by the public finance approach to financial 
integration is demonstrated by the performance of developing countries during the Great 
Recession. The resilience they displayed during the 2008-09 crisis has been the ultimate litmus 
test, notwithstanding the skepticism about self-insurance expressed in Caballero (2003).
23 The 
reason of course is that EMs went considerably beyond simply building up IR. They benefited by 
adopting controlled exchange rate flexibility and the active management of external balance sheet 
exposure by using reserves to cover short-term debt and in some cases taking steps to minimize 
currency mismatches on private sector balance sheets. During the 2008-09 crisis, about half of the 
emerging markets managed the crisis without significant IR depletion (including Chile, China, 
Columbia, Egypt, Israel, Thailand, South Africa). Their reserves reduced their sovereign risk 
premia, deterring financial attacks. The other half of the emerging markets depleted between one-
                                                 
22 A vivid example of this policy has been Chile, where a fraction of the revenues from copper exports were 
saved in years when the price of copper exceeded a moving average of past years. In years when the price 
of copper has been below the moving average of past years, the accumulated funds have been used to 
buffer the fiscal expenditure of the Chile: saving in good times, dissaving in bad times, and supporting 
counter cyclical fiscal policy stance of Chile.  Commodity-driven swings of boom and bust have defined 
Latin America‘s economic history for the past 100 years. ―That is a cycle that needs to be ended,‖ Velasco 
said. ―We have been out to show that a Latin American country can manage properly, and not mismanage, 
a commodity cycle.  You save in times of abundance, and you invest in lean times.‖ [citation?] 
23 Remarkably, there was not a single systemic financial sector crisis in any emerging market, even though 
systemic banks in some countries (e.g. Latvia, Ukraine) came under threat.   20 
tenth and one-third of their IR at the peak of the global crisis.
24 Most of them bounced back to 
respectable growth paths without the need for massive external help. Those emerging market and 
developing countries that relied on external help (such as Korea and Mexico, which used swap 
lines extended by the US Federal Reserve Board or IMF stabilization packages) were 
characterized by large balance sheet exposure, where lax financial regulations prior to the crisis 
increased their vulnerability. 
While the decoupling of EMs from the recession impacting the OECD has been elusive, 
emerging markets countries have became key contributors to the post-crisis global growth, led by 
the largest and most populous, China and India, and the other BRICS.
25 Overall, these countries 
adopted a heterodox approach to self-insurance, consisting of a move to the trilemma middle 
ground supported by reserve accumulation and underpinned by the public finance approach to 
financial integration, the essence of which is that the social gains from deeper financial 
integration should be balanced against the social costs of growing exposure to turbulence.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC FINANCE APPROACH 
The global crisis of 2008-09, which originated in the financial sector of the US on the one 
hand and showcased the resilience of developing markets as a result of their adopting a public 
finance approach in response to their own crises on the other, both point to the urgency for policy 
makers to balance the interests of the financial and real sectors. In particular, low and uneven 
standards of prudential regulation could lead to devastating crises in the financial sector with 
negative spillovers into the real sector as illustrated by the 2008-09 crisis. The chances are that 
OECD countries overshot the optimal level of financial deregulation in the decade before the 
crisis with financial globalization going too far. We illustrate this possibility in a reduced form 
model of the GDP, decomposing the economy into financial and non-financial sectors. The 
financial sector provides competitive financial intermediation services, measured by FI, 
facilitating the production of a stochastic final output, Y, Y = Y(FI); Y ’ > 0, and Y’’ < 0. Financial 
services FI are measured in constant dollar (equivalently, in terms of the numeraire good). The 
choice of FI is done prior to the realization of the random shocks affecting the final output, Y. 
In the absence of distortions, with risk neutral agents, the optimal financial intermediation 
is at the level that maximizes the expected profits, E[Y - FI]. Consequently, the optimal level of 
financial intermediation, denoted by FI0, is at the level where the expected marginal benefit of 
                                                 
24 Emerging markets that lost at least 10% of reserves include Russia (36%), Poland (28%), Malaysia 
(27%), Korea (25%), India (21%), Peru (17%), Indonesia (16%), Turkey and Brazil (about 10%). See 
Aizenman and Sun (2009) for further discussion. 
25 See for example, Canuto and Giugale (2010).   21 
financial intermediation, E[Y’], equals the expected marginal cost, 1. The corresponding total 
GDP is Y(FI0). It can be decomposed to give the nonfinancial GDP; GDPnf = Y(FI0) – FI0, 
while the GDP contribution of the financial sector is FI0.  Figure 3, top panel characterizes the 
equilibrium at point A, where the expected cost of financial intermediation, EMC[FI], equals the 
expected marginal benefit, EMB[FI].
26  
Financial distortions, like moral hazard associated with the ―too big to fail‖ doctrine, shift 
the private valuation of the expected marginal benefit of FI up, and the expected marginal cost 
down; to EMB[FI*], EMC[FI*] respectively. The net effect is that, relative to the nondistorted 
equilibrium, moral hazard induces excessive financial intermediation [shifting the equilibrium 
financial intermediation from point A to point B in Figure 3, lower panel, increasing the financial 
intermediation from FI0 to FI0*]. The welfare cost of the distortion induced by moral hazard is 
the dotted triangle at the bottom panel of Figure 3. 
In a risk-neutral economy, policy z should be set to minimize the welfare costs of 
financial distortions. In such an economy, financial depth, FI/GDP, is not a goal by itself. 
Financial intermediation may be too lucrative if the expected social marginal benefit of financial 
depth falls short of the expected social cost.  
We list three policy implications of the above framework: 
  Too much financial intermediation may be bad for the economy. Financial innovation that 
may deepen financial intermediation would be undesirable if the marginal social benefit of 
financial innovation (the net increase in E[Y - FI]) fall shorts of the marginal social cost of 
the financial innovation, thereby reducing welfare. In the US itself, the share of financial 
intermediation was about 5 percent of GDP in 1980. It reached about 8 percent prior to the 
crisis, with the bulk of the increase happening in the 2000s. Figure 4 shows that financial 
intermediation was well below 5 percent during most of the 20
th century, with the exception 
of the decade prior to the Great Depression and Great Recessions. While correlation is not 
causation, the search for the gains in the performance of nonfinancial sectors as a result of the 
massive increase in financial depth in the US and the global economy remains elusive.  
  There is a potential rivalry between the interests of the financial sector and the nonfinancial 
economy. Regulation level z, z = (leverage, reserve ratio, intermediation tax, etc.) should be 
set at a level such that the social marginal cost of FI equals the social marginal social benefit 
measured in relation to the nonfinancial sector. 
                                                 
26 In terms of Figure 3, In the absence of distortions, EMB[FI]=  E[d Y(FI) /d FI ]= E[Y’];    
EMC[FI]= E[d FI /d FI] = 1. Note that total expected GDP equals the trapezoid below the bold curve, 
EMB[FI]; between zero and FI0.     22 
  There is a built-in bias against financial regulation: Crises prevented by tighter financial 
regulation are unobservable and therefore not credited to the policy maker. Yet, the cost of 
financial regulation is transparent and debited to the policy maker. This asymmetry means 
that a higher regulatory effort, while preventing crises, tends to erode support over time for 
future regulation (Aizenman, 2010). 
 
WHAT SHOULD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DO POST GREAT RECESSION? 
The massive resumption of inflows of capital to emerging markets in 2010 has 
strengthened the need for prudential regulations dealing with inflows of hot money. These 
inflows reflect both ‗yield chasing‘ induced by the low interest rates and quantitative easing in the 
US and Europe, and the presumption that EMs are the new locomotive for global growth. What 
should emerging markets do in these circumstances? 
With vulnerability endogenous to private agents‘ actions and behavior, optimality calls 
for a mixture of partial insurance and preventive methods reducing the frequency and intensity of 
the calamity (analogous to requiring installation of fire alarms and external lights in a house, 
setting speed limits for drivers, making air-bags in cars mandatory, etc, as controls or conditions 
for insurance provision). This logic applies equally well to the emerging markets‘ exposure to 
sudden stops and deleveraging shocks – developing countries must supplement hoarding 
international reserves with policies that would reduce their exposure to capital flight. Such 
policies could include proactive steps to place public finances on a sustainable trajectory by 
raising primary fiscal surpluses while simultaneously taking steps to limit contingent liabilities 
from private external debt and mismatches on private sector balance sheets—as indeed several 
important emerging markets did after 2001. 
Today‘s challenges (a more extreme form of past challenges) are exemplified by Korea: 
the Bank of Korea may hold IR as a buffer against instability associated with private banks‘ 
external borrowing, the carry trade and other activities the social benefits of which to the 
nonfinancial sector may fall short of the social cost associated with the growing exposure of the 
taxpayer to the need to bailout systemic financial players in bad times.
27 Regulations reducing 
                                                 
27 See Aizenman (2011) for a case study of Korea‘s under-regulated external exposure prior to the 2008-09 
crisis, and a public finance view of optimal regulation external borrowing and hoarding of IR.  See Ostry et 
al. (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2011) and the references therein for further analysis of conditions 
conducive to the inclusion of capital controls in the policy toolkit of EMs. An interesting observation on IR 
and carry trade: ―Countries with large stocks of international reserves and a high domestic interest rate may 
inadvertently be counter-parties to the carry trade. While carry-traders borrow in low interest currencies 
and invest in high interest currencies, most reserve building countries invest in low interest foreign 
currencies and borrow at the (relatively higher) domestic interest rate.‖ Dominguez et al. (2011).  This   23 
external borrowing may trim the demand for IR, increasing the overall welfare of the economy. 
The public finance approach is reflected in Hyun Song Shin‘s statement, advising South Korea‘s 
government: ―…it should tax the wholesale liabilities of the country‘s banks. Whenever a South 
Korean bank wants to expand its loan book faster than its retail deposits, it relies on foreign 
borrowing to fill the gap. So a levy on these extra liabilities would serve to limit banks‘ 
borrowing abroad.‖ [The Economist, November 11, 2010].  
Taxing surges in external borrowing by domestic banks is a discretionary tool that could 
support prudential supervision (Aizenman (2011)). This policy tool is akin to an international 
version of the FDIC‘s policies in the US. A deposit in a bank covered by the FDIC allows the 
bank to expand its balance sheet, increasing the expected liabilities of the FDIC (i.e., the 
taxpayer) at a rate proportional to the riskiness of bank‘s portfolio. The insurance offered by the 
FDIC destroys any incentive for the saver to monitor the bank. This distortion could be dealt with 
by imposing a risk premium on the bank, at a rate reflecting its riskiness.  
The main difference between the FDIC‘s risk premium and external borrowing by banks 
in emerging markets is that the FDIC covers deposits in US dollars, and is indirectly backed by 
US ability to cover these liabilities by fiat money and/or domestic taxes. In contrast, external 
borrowing by EMs banks increases the balance sheet exposure of the country to foreign currency 
debt. By analogy, this exposure should be dealt by the accumulation of IR and by the proper risk 
premium, inducing banks to internalize the impact of external borrowing on the taxpayers‘ 
exposure to future bailouts. Ironically, economists who oppose an external borrowing tax, 
viewing it as an impediment to free mobility of capital, rarely support the abolition of deposit 
insurance!  
In the meanwhile, concerns about the growing exposure of these countries to the risk 
associated with sudden reversal of hot money flows post 2008-09 is inducing emerging markets 
to adopt various regulations taxing external borrowing and hot money. These policies are not a 
substitute for the need to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline in EMs. Yet, short of moving to 
financial autarky, prudential regulations dealing with external borrowing may help in mitigating 
the downside risk of hot money. Table A1 provides a summary of these steps in 2010-11.  
The effectiveness of prudential regulation dealing with capital flows is an important open 
research agenda. The well-documented experience of Chile with unremunerated reserve 
requirement suggests that this policy changed the composition of inflows towards longer 
                                                                                                                                                 
observation is consistent with the view that the optimal accumulation of reserves should be addressed as 
part of a comprehensive prudential regulation that would recognize possible externalities associated with 
carry trade exposures.   
   24 
maturities, without significantly affecting the overall volume [see Edwards (1999)]. Focusing on 
the recent experience of Brazil, Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka and Straub (2011) report that the 
regulations induced capital outflows from Brazil, in line with the intention of the Brazilian 
authorities.
28 Experience suggests that the private sector reacts over time to the regulations and to 
changing global and local circumstances. Therefore, proper prudential regulation and supervision 
should be a dynamically evolving framework. This is vividly reflected in the recent experience of 
Korea and other countries.
29 The interaction between the regulator and the private sector suggests 
that some regulations tend to lose their bite overtime. Hence, policy makers may adopt a mixture 
of temporary measures dealing with unanticipated transitory shocks, and more enduring policies 
[reserve requirements, taxes, etc.] at rates that evolve overtime, responding to changing risk 
exposure and to the size of capital flows.      
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A salient macroeconomic trend during the 1990s-2000s was the massive financial 
globalization of emerging markets. While the links between faster growth and the external 
financial integration of these countries has been tenuous at best, an unintended consequence has 
been their growing exposure to financial turbulence associated with sudden stops of inflows of 
capital, capital flights, and deleveraging crises. The significant output and social costs associated 
with financial crises, estimated on average at more than 10 percent of GDP, has highlighted the 
need for going beyond the three policy goals framed by the original trilemma. In response to the 
crises of 1997-2001, several emerging market countries added financial stability as an explicit 
goal, built up reserves and adopted a public finance approach to financial integration 
incorporating the control of private sector balance sheet vulnerabilities and the attendant 
contingent fiscal liabilities into their policy formulation.  
The subsequent resilience emerging markets displayed during the global crisis of 2008-09 
is an eye-opener, not just for developing countries but OECD countries as well. A key lesson is 
                                                 
28 They looked at the impact of the March 2008 1.5% tax on fixed income investment, and the October 
2009 2 % tax on all foreign portfolio investments).  Using fund level capita flows data (fixed income), they 
found that the regulations induced capital outflows from Brazil. 
29 From July 25 2011 onward, financial institutions operating in Korea are no longer allowed to buy FX-
denominated bonds issued onshore by Korean companies (―Kimchi bonds‖) who swap proceeds into local 
currency. A Bank of Korea official explained the policy intent saying that ―local firms should raise funds in 
won when they use the money here.‖ Kimchi bond issuance had risen considerably in the months before the 
policy change, because all-in borrowing costs are lower than for comparable won-denominated debt. 
[Financial times, ―Seoul takes kimchi bonds off the menu,‖ July 19, 2011]. 
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that financial regulation and integration should be defined in the context of a public finance 
approach, aiming at maximizing the contribution of financial intermediation to the expected 
performance of the economy. The goal should not be to maximize financial stability, but to 
choose policies balancing the expected cost of crises to the economy at the margin with the 
provision of efficient financial intermediation services to the non- financial sector of the 
economy.  
  The 2008-09 crisis demonstrated the risk of low and uneven standards of prudential 
regulation. With the very real risk of the financial sector tail wagging the real sector dog, bubbles 
in the real estate market and the wider economy, frequently associated with easy leverage and 
inflows of hot money, are too costly to ignore. IT bubbles may be fine (even efficient) in a vibrant 
technology sector, where the financial damage following the burst of the bubble impacts a few 
sophisticated agents. Such a bubble subsidizes investment in new technology, and may provide a 
social benefit if there is underinvestment in IT in the absence of bubbles. In contrast, housing 
bubbles lead to economy-wide damage, costly debt deflation, and large stock of foreclosed 
houses that degrade the economy. The US is a prime example of a country where the real estate 
sector plays a pivotal role in accounting for the business cycle, inducing Leamer (2007) to 
conclude that in the US ―Housing IS the Business Cycle‖. This result may be US specific, 
reflecting the favorable tax treatment of housing, and the mortgage subsidies associated with the 
operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
30 Yet, in most countries housing is the prime 
financial asset of the middle class, and turbulence in the real estate market directly affects the 
stability of the banking system.  
Even if a bubble cannot be identified ex-ante, chances are that one can pin down the 
probability of a housing bubble. To illustrate this, in the 2000s, the probability of a housing 
bubble was close to zero in Germany (experiencing an overall constant valuation of real estate), 
yet positive and increasing in the US (see Shiller (2000)).
31 Chances are that regulations lowering 
the Loan to Value Ceiling [LTVC] reduce the probability of a bubble [see policies in Hong Kong 
SAR, China; Singapore; and China, where dynamic LTVC regulations are used in a counter-
                                                 
30 U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner acknowledged in November 2009 interview with the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that government-sponsored mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, were the biggest sources of moral hazard, leading investors to count on a bailout for risks gone wrong 
[Bloomberg, Feb 18, 2010]. 
31 Shiller‘s 2000 book (and its 2005 extended edition) explains why we should worry about the formation 
of bubbles in general, and in the housing market in particular.  Curiously, Shiller‘s warning were ignored 
by policy makers, apparently being convinced by Greenspan‘s (2002) position that monetary policy should 
not try to lean against asset-price bubbles, but rather should just clean up after they burst.  This ―cleaning 
up‖ turned out to be a validation of the large costs associated with debt deflation, and the ex-post 
inefficiency of the foreclosure system in the US.   26 
cyclical ways]. Recent suggestions [Co-VAR, VAR, stress tests] are useful, but simplicity and 
greater transparency of positions has its virtues: transparent LTVC regulations; derivatives 
restricted to traded exchanges, where positions of systemic players are monitored, would help. 
While a decisive approach to financial sector regulation is clearly needed—even to the 
point of curbing the growth and size of the financial sector, the chances are that financial system 
agents will resist change to protect their rents and one-way bets with publicly-funded bailouts on 
the downside. The built-in bias against financial regulation noted earlier needs to be recognized 
and counteracted. Financial integration during the 1990s-2000s globalized arbitrage, while the 
national tax bases have been saddled with the resultant costly bailouts at times of trouble.  
  In contrast to some OECD countries, which had access to elastic swap lines that 
facilitated their adjustment, most emerging markets and developing countries were left to their 
own devices, deleveraging their exposure by drawing down reserves, or more painful 
adjustments. The resilience of emerging markets and developing countries during the 2008-09 
crisis validated the logic of self-insurance as part of the overall design of macroeconomic 
policies. A desirable configuration of macro policies that allowed countries to reduce their 
exposure to the 2008-09 crisis included: (i) sound management of the public finances to place 
public debt on a sustainable trajectory; (ii) building up international reserves; (iii) prudential steps 
to reduce contingent liabilities from private sector balance sheets; and (iv) moving to the 
trilemma middle ground with its emphasis on controlled exchange rate flexibility.  
None of these policies would probably have sufficed on its own to insulate emerging 
markets from global turbulence; but agile combinations of these policies provided policy makers 
with the needed tools to limit debilitating growth and confidence crises in EMs in the wake of the 
global crisis.  Indeed, the limited capacity to move along the lines proposed by Caballero (2003) 
and the validation of the self gains from self-insurance is one of the lessons from the crisis. Self-
insurance lays bare the limitations of the global system in dealing efficiently with the global 
imbalances, and stresses the need for coordinating financial regulation across national borders. By 
virtue of their limited internal safety nets and their relative poverty, emerging markets do not 
have the luxury to wait for the collective resolution of the challenges associated with global 
imbalances and the proliferation of under-regulated financial flows that the G20 is aiming at. 
Hence, self-insurance combined with the public finance approach to financial integration may be 
an optimal response of emerging markets in a second best global structure.    27 
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Trilemma Indices, 1970-2009
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Definitions: The index for the extent of monetary independence (MI); MI = 
1 0.5[ ( , ) ( 1)] ij corr i i     , where i refers to home countries and j to the base country (the base country 
is defined as the country that a home country‘s monetary policy is most closely linked with, as defined in 
Shambaugh (2004).
33 By construction, higher values of the index mean higher monetary policy 
independence. For the countries and years for which Shambaugh‘s data are available, the base countries 
from his work are used, and for the others, the base countries are assigned based on IMF‘s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and CIA Factbook. 
Exchange rate stability (ERS), ERS = Annual standard deviations of monthly exchange rate series 
between the home country and the base country are calculated and included in the following formula to 
normalize the index between zero and one:  0.01/[0.01 ( (log( _ ))] ERS stdev exch rate     .   
Financial openness (KAOPEN): KAOPEN = A de jure index of capital account openness constructed by 
Chinn and Ito (ref), normalized between zero and one. Higher values of this index indicate that a country is 
more open to cross-border capital transactions. 
 
  
                                                 
32 Source: Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2011, forthcoming, JJIE)  
33 The base countries group identified by Shambaugh include Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, 
Malaysia, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S., Shambaugh fitted the base country j to country i, reflecting 
county i‘s policy choices.   32 
Figure 2 Hoarding International Reserves /GDP patterns, 1977-2009 
The figure depicts total reserves minus gold to GDP ratio. Source: IFS – IMF 
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The dotted trapezoid in panel (a) measures the expected GDP. The dotted triangle in panel (b) 
measures the welfare cost of the financial distortions leading to excessive financial 
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Table A1: Recent Macro-prudential Measures and Capital Controls in Emerging Markets
a/ 




Type  Nature  Summary 
Brazil  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows  IOF Tax on foreign inflows increased from 2% to 4%. 
Brazil  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows  IOF Tax on foreign inflows increased from 4% to 6%. 
Brazil  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on derivatives  Margins on derivative contracts by non-residents on BM&F Bovespa to be taxed at 6%, up from 0.38%.  
Brazil  2010  I  T  CC    Brazilian financial institutions banned from renting, lending or swapping assets to foreigners seeking to invest in the futures market. 
Brazil  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows  IOF tax reduced from 6% to 2% for overseas investments into private equity funds, or FIPs, and venture capital funds 
Brazil  2011  I  T  CM  URR 
Starting April 4, Brazilian banks will need to deposit in cash at the central bank 60 percent of their short positions in U.S. dollars above 
$3 billion or their capital base, whichever is smaller. The reserves will not earn interest. 
Chile  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  From December 1, in 3 successive moves, foreign investment limits for pension funds to rise from 80 percent from 60 percent of assets.  
China  2010  I  E  CC 
Foreign investors' 
access  Some overseas FIs allowed to invest their foreign yuan holdings in domestic interbank market bonds.  
India  2010  I  T  CC 
Interest Rate Caps on 
ECB  Interest rate cap on eligible external commercial borrowing re-instated.  
Indonesia  2010    T  OM 
Minimum holding 
periods on central 
bank bills  Minimum holding period introduced on central bank debt instruments, for both residents and non-residents. 
Indonesia  2010  I  T  CM  Reserve Ratios  Foreign-currency deposit RR increased from 1% to 5% in March. 
Indonesia  2010  I  T  CM  Reserve Ratios  Foreign-currency deposit RR increased from 5% to 8% in June 
Indonesia  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios 
30% RR on vostro accounts (rupiah-denominated transaction accounts held by non-residents), beginning end-Jan-11 with 3-month 
transition. 
Indonesia  2010  I  T  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Limit (30%) on daily balance of banks' short term external debt re-instated. 
Korea  2010  I  E  CC  Withholding Tax  Removed withholding tax of 0-15% (depending on tax treaty) on interest, capital gains tax and transaction tax for non-residents. 
Korea  2010    T  CC 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches 
Tightened limit on FX derivatives contracts of domestic banks and foreign bank branches with domestic residents (100% of value of 
exports from 125%) 
Korea  2010  I  T  CC 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches  New limits set on FX derivatives contracts of domestic banks (50% of previous month‘s capital) and branches of foreign banks (250%).  
Korea  2010  I  T  CM  Exchange controls   Bank loans in foreign currency to be restricted to overseas uses only. Small and medium sized manufacturers exempted. 
Korea  2010  I  T 
CC/
CM 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches  Tighten existing regulations on foreign currency liquidity of domestic banks.  
Korea  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows  14% withholding tax on interest income on bonds bought by foreign investors as well as a 20% capital gains tax re-imposed. 
Korea  2010  I  T  CM  Tax on Inflows 
Announced plans to legislate a macro-prudential stability levy on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities. The levy will fund provision 
of FX liquidity when necessary.    36 




Type  Nature  Summary 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Reserve requirements on non-deposit foreign liabilities with maturity less than 2 years raised to 35% from 0%. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on derivatives  30% income tax introduced for settlement of derivative contract with offshore banks (imposed on local financial institutions) 
Peru  2010   
T, 
E  CM 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches 
Changed limits on banks‘ net FX position to 75 percent for long position (from 100 percent) and 15 percent for short position (from 10 
percent) 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Reserve requirements on non-deposit foreign liabilities with maturity less than 2 years raised to 40% from 35%. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Marginal reserve requirements on local currency deposits held by foreigners increased to 35% (from 30%) . 
Peru  2010      OM 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches 
Imposed private pension funds' limit on trading FX at 0.85% of assets under management (for daily transactions) and 1.95% (over 5-day 
period) 
Peru  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Operating limit on pension funds‘ overseas investments increased to 28 percent from 26 percent. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Reserve requirements on non-deposit foreign liabilities with maturity less than 2 years raised to 50% from 40%. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Marginal reserve requirements on local currency deposits held by foreigners increased to 45% (from 35%) . 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Reserve requirements on non-deposit foreign liabilities with maturity less than 2 years raised to 65% from 50%. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Marginal reserve requirements on local currency deposits held by foreigners increased to 50% (from 45%) . 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC 
Foreign investors' 
access  Fee on foreign purchases of central bank liquidity draining instruments increased to 400 bps. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Marginal reserve requirements on local currency deposits held by foreigners increased to 65% (from 50%) . 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Marginal reserve requirements on local currency deposits held by foreigners increased to 120% (from 65%) . 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Reserve Ratios  Reserve requirements on non-deposit foreign liabilities with maturity less than 2 years raised to 75% from 65%. 
Peru  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Operating limit on pension funds‘ overseas investments increased to 30 percent from 28 percent. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CM  Reserve Ratios  Increased marginal reserve requirements to 25% for domestic currency lending and to 55% for foreign currency lending by banks 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows 
Imposed 30 percent capital gains tax on non-residents‘ investments in the stock market for transactions through Peruvian broker and at 5 
percent for transactions through a non-resident broker. 
Peru  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows  30% tax on foreign investor gains from PEN-denominated futures maturing within 60 days. 
Peru  2011  I  T  CM  Reserve Ratios  Reduced reserve requirements on foreign currency liabilities to 60 percent 
Peru  2011    T  CM 
Limits to FX 
exposure/ currency 
mismatches  US Dollar forward holdings of companies limited to 40% of assets or 400mn, whichever is greater. 
Philippines  2010  O  E  CC  Exchange controls  
Allow prepayment of BSP-registered foreign/foreign currency loans of the private sector to be funded with FX from AABs/AAB-FX 
corps without prior BSP approval. 
Philippines  2010  O  E  CC  Exchange controls   Banks allowed to process remittance requests by foreign investors without prior approval.  
Philippines  2010  O  E  CC  Exchange controls   Increase in FX purchase limit for outward investment by residents. 
Philippines  2010  O  E  CC 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
Registration requirements for outward investments by residents in excess of USD 60 million lifted and replaced by reporting 
requirements.  
South Africa  2010    T  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
As of 1 March 2010 South African banks will be able to acquire direct and indirect foreign exposure up to 25% of their total liabilities 
(excluding equity), covering all foreign exposure but excluding FDI. The initial limit of 40% has been adjusted downwards in light of 
recent international developments   37 




Type  Nature  Summary 
South Africa  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Authorities (i) eliminated the 10 percent levy on the capital that South Africans could transfer upon emigration, (ii) raised the limit on 
individuals investment offshore to R4 million per year from R4 million in a lifetime, (iii) and raised the single discretionary allowance 
to R1 million from R750,000 
South Africa  2010  O  E  CC  Exchange Controls  Increased limits to allow different types of institutions to take between 25 and 35 percent of assets abroad. 
South Africa  2010    E  CC  Exchange Controls 
Authorities allowed qualifying international headquarter companies to raise and deploy capital offshore without exchange control 
approval 
Taiwan, 
China  2010  I  T  CM   
The rate on reserve requirements for currency deposits will be increased to 0.193 percent from 0.178 percent, while the rate for Taiwan, 
China dollar time deposits was lifted to 0.934 percent from 0.855 percent 
Taiwan, 
China  2010  I  T  CC 
Foreign investors' 
access 
Offshore funds restricted to investing no more than 30 percent of their portfolios into local government debt and money-market 
products. 
Taiwan, 
China  2010  I  T  CC  Exchange controls  Trading in NDFs capped at one-fifth of a bank's total FX trading 
Taiwan, 
China  2010  I  T  CC  URR 
Monetary authority won‘t pay lenders interest from Jan. 1 on reserves held for deposits from foreigners. It currently pays interest on 55 
percent of the reserves. 
Thailand  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings  Raised limits on foreign asset accumulation by residents, including outward FDI 
Thailand  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Removed limit on direct overseas investment, relaxed restrictions on lending by Thai firms to non-resident borrowers, and raised cap on 
offshore property purchase 
Thailand  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Permitted Thai companies to invest abroad in the form of direct investment or lend to affiliated companies up to USD 50 million per 
year 
Thailand  2010  O  E  CC 
Ceilings on foreign 
investment/ external 
borrowings 
Relaxed other regulations for Thai residents which include: raising outstanding balance limits on foreign currency deposit accounts 
deposited with funds exchanged from commercial banks; increasing amount limit for purchase of immovable properties abroad; relaxing 
regulations on repatriation by raising the threshold amount above which foreign currency proceeds are required to be brought into 
Thailand, as well as relaxing the related reporting requirement 
Thailand  2010  I  T  CC  Tax on Inflows 
Withholding tax of 15% to be imposed on interest income and capital gains receivable by non-resident corporate and individual 
investors on bonds issued by the government, state enterprises and the Bank of Thailand. 
Turkey  2010  I  E  CC  Tax on Inflows  Reduction in withholding tax rate on bonds issued abroad by Turkish firms with a maturity of over 3 years.  
 
a/See Pasricha (2011) for further analysis and sources. The following abbreviations used: I/O – Inflow/outflow;  T/E – Tightening/easing; Type – CC – capital 
control;  CM – Currency based measure; OM – other measure; Source: IMF AREAER 2002 - 2009, Reinhart and Reinhart 2008, national sources and news 
articles. 